Este trabajo reflexiona sobre la función que cumple la junta de socios en las sociedades de capital, cuestionando la idea común de que la junta tiene encomendada la tarea de formar la voluntad social. La junta no cumple un papel universal en el derecho de sociedades, sino que su función viene determinada por la estructura de propiedad de la sociedad. En las sociedades de estructura concentrada la junta hace efectivos los deberes de lealtad de los socios mayoritarios cuando éstos toman las decisiones sociales. En cambio, en las sociedades de capital disperso, la junta disciplina a los administradores en el interés de los socios. Por tanto, el derecho debe desarrollar las herramientas necesarias para responder a las necesidades que plantea cada caso.
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Economic Foundations of the General Shareholders’ Meeting
This paper explores the functions of the General Shareholders’ Meeting and raises doubts on a widely extended opinion sustaining that General Shareholders’ Meeting has a leading role in corporate decision- making. Nevertheless, there is no such thing as a universal function of the General Shareholders’ Meeting. The functions accomplished are highly dependent on the ownership structure of the corporations. Thus, in corporations with concentrated ownership the General Shareholders Meeting is the time and place in which the controlling shareholders duties of loyalty become effective affecting the decision-making process. Conversely, in corporations with a dispersed ownership, the General Shareholders’ Meeting serves the purposes of controlling the Board of Directors, thus defending the interests of shareholders. Consequently, regulation attention should be drawn to the development of efficient tools for dealing with the different scenarios.