Con frecuencia, se afirma que el recurso de amparo es un elemento «atípico» del modelo kelseniano de jurisdicción constitucional. Así, se trataría de una técnica procesal que no pertenece a su esencia, sino de una competencia «añadida» del Tribunal Constitucional. El objeto de este trabajo es sugerir argumentos que sirvan a poner a prueba la contundencia de esta tesis. Con base en evidencias historiográficas y en conceptos originalistas de la teoría kelseniana, se concluye que ni desde un punto de vista descriptivo, ni desde uno prescriptivo, es suficientemente solvente sostener que el recurso de amparo sea un elemento incompatible con el modelo concentrado de la jurisdicción constitucional.

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The writ of amparo in the Kelsenian model of constitutional review. An atypical element?

It is often thought that the appeal seeking protection of Constitutional rights before the Constitutional Court – recurso de amparo, in Spanish – is not an element of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in the Kelsenian model. In this sense, it would be considered a rule of procedure that would not be part of the essence of the model but just an additional power given to the Constitutional Court. The purpose of this paper is to provide arguments in order to challenge such approach. Based on historical evidence and in originalist concepts of the Kelsenian model, the paper concludes that neither from a descriptive perspective, nor from a prescriptive perspective, it is reasonable to suggest that the appeal before the Constitutional Court is incompatible with the centralized model of constitutional jurisdiction.